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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research is to investigate precautions that consumers take before installing
mobile apps and consumer’s potential desensitization to excessive app permission requests.
Through a survey of 209 participants, a prediction model was created that attempts to predict
whether respondents would download applications asking for excessive permissions. The model
results indicate those that take more precautions are less likely to download apps requesting
excessive permissions. However, the precautions taken by participants may be inadequate and
may leave consumers with a false since of security. Another key finding with the support of
Communication Theory and the C-HIP Model is that some consumers have become desensitized
to excessive permission requests. These consumers knowingly install apps requesting excessive
permissions for reasons such as nothing bad has happened to them before, they trust the market,
or they really want the app. The security implications of permission desensitization and
inadequate precautions are discussed.
Keywords: Mobile APPs, installation of mobile APPs, consumer desensitization
INTRODUCTION
Smartphones and tablets have been rapidly increasing in worldwide sales over the last few years.
Gartner predicts smartphones will account for 90% of all mobile phones by 2018 (Gartner, 2014)
and tablet sales will surpass PC sales in 2016 (Gartner, 2015). As of fall 2015, Google’s Android
operating system was on 64% of the world’s smartphones and tablets and Apple’s iOS was on 23%
(Statcounter, 2015). These two platforms lead the mobile market by a larger margin.
The app markets associated with these two popular platforms are Google’s Google Play market
and Apple’s App Store, with each containing over 1.5 million downloadable applications (Statista,
2015). A significant risk to consumers that download and install mobile applications is malware.
McAfee (2015) reports that malware is on the rise, with over 1 million new mobile malware
samples detected in early 2015. Also, 99% of all mobile malware is written for the Android
operating system (Cisco, 2014). However, Apple applications are not without risk. In a report on
poplar apps, iOS apps were found to be more risky than Android apps (Appthority, 2014). In
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addition, the report highlighted that 95% of the top free Android and iOS apps and 80% of paid
apps exhibited at least one risky behavior.
With the increase in smart devices, apps, and malware, consumers should take precautions before
installing apps. According to research and government agencies, potential precautions consumers
can take are to review the app developers (IC3, 2012), use only trusted app markets (FCC, 2014),
and read app permissions (Harris et al., 2014). App permission requests are apps asking the
consumer for permission to access data or services on the device, such as an app asking to know
the consumer’s location. Excessive permission requests are apps asking for access to data or
services that are not necessary for the app to reasonably function, such as a card game requesting
permission to send text messages. Consumers that choose to ignore excessive permission requests
and install the app anyway may have become desensitized to excessive permission requests. Two
potential reasons for desensitization are that the consumer trusts the market to protect them and
nothing bad has happened to them before. Also used as a precaution, but not recommended by
researchers, is reading app reviews and star ratings (Kelley et al., 2012)
The purpose of this research is to investigate precautions that consumers take before installing
mobile apps and consumer’s potential desensitization to excessive app permission requests.
Knowing what precautions consumers take before installing apps will be helpful in determining if
consumers are taking the proper security precautions. Investigating desensitization to excessive
permission requests will be helpful in determining the overall effectiveness of the permission
request warning. Consumers may be exposing themselves to increased risk by not fully
understanding the proper precautions to take and the risks associated with desensitization.
In the next section, we discuss various precautions that consumers may take when downloading
mobile applications. Within this context, we incorporate findings from the research literature and
develop our hypotheses. Similarly, we discuss the notion of desensitization, report previous
findings, and develop our associated hypotheses. In the next section, we provide a detailed
description of our survey instrument, which includes a prediction model for installing applications
with excessive permissions. In the final two sections, we offer a discussion of our findings and
our conclusions.
Precautions
In this study, we investigate several actions consumers perceive as precautions they may take
before downloading and installing a mobile application. One is to review and understand the
permission requests, as recommended by researchers and government agencies (FCC, 2014; Harris
et al., 2014; IC3, 2012). While other platforms also use permissions, permission requests are more
prevalent on the Android platform. Every time a consumer downloads and begins installing an
application, a list of permissions needed by the application are displayed for the consumer’s
consent. This list of permissions tells the consumer what services or data the app needs to function.
However, it is important for the consumer to match each permission request with an actual feature
of the app. For example, if an app asks for GPS location, what feature in the app would use
location? If it is a map app, then that makes sense. If it is a solitaire card game, then asking for
GPS location is excessive and not warranted. Consumers should also read the app’s description,
as some developers explain their permission requests. Carefully reading app permissions is
important and research has shown that popular applications, free applications, and mature content
applications request more permissions than average (Chia et al., 2012). While permissions are
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displayed as a warning to consumers, research has shown using app permissions as a precaution
has not been an effective security measure because many consumers simply do not read them (Felt
et al. 2012; Mylonas et al., 2013) or do not understand them (Benton et al., 2013; Kelley et al.,
2012). Based on this previous research, we propose the following hypothesis:
H1: Most consumers will not read app permissions as a precaution before installing
a mobile app.
Another action consumers often take as a security precaution is to only install apps from trusted
sources, as suggested by researchers and government agencies (FCC, 2014; Harris et al., 2014;
IC3, 2012). While malware can be found on traditional markets, like Google’s Google Play and
Apple’s App Store, most malware is found on 3rd party markets (Juniper, 2013). For Android
users, accessing 3rd party markets is as easy as checking a security setting in the system settings.
This freedom Android gives their users is one of the reasons why malware is more prevalent on
the Android platform. Apple users must jailbreak their devices in order to access 3rd party markets,
which is a much more difficult process and one reason why Apple’s iOS platform is considered
safer than Android. When it comes to trusting traditional markets, research suggests that most
consumers trust the official markets associated with their platform to deliver safe applications
(Kelley et al., 2012; Mylonas et al., 2013; Jones & Chin, 2015; Jones et al., 2014). Therefore, we
propose the following hypotheses:
H2: Consumers will trust the major platform markets more than 3rd party markets.
H3: Most consumers will only download apps from trusted markets.
Using star ratings and reading reviews are other actions some consumers take to gauge security of
the app. In one study, participants relied heavily on star ratings, full text reviews, and even word
of mouth because they were better understood and trusted than permissions (Kelley et al., 2012).
However, research has not shown these actions as reliable security methods, such as a study that
concluded that community ratings used in app markets are not reliable indicators of app risks and
ratings are based on functional aspects like features and performance rather than risks (Chia et al.,
2012). Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:
H4: Most consumers will use star ratings and reviews as a precaution before installing
an app.
Finally, it is recommended that consumers investigate and read reviews about the developers
themselves (IC3, 2012; Harris & Patten, 2014). However, no research could be found that
investigated developer reviews with the riskiness of the apps they develop. Because research has
shown many consumers do not read permission requests, we believe many consumers will also not
research the developer. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
H5: Most consumers will not review developers as a precaution before installing an
app.
In other permission research, some have suggested unique ways of understanding permission
requests. Sarma et al. (2012) suggest a model that compares the app’s permission requests to
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similar apps within the same category, such as an arcade game’s app permission requests compared
to other arcade game’s permission requests. An app asking for more permissions than what is
normal for the category may be an indicator of risk. In similar research that investigated
permission requests, Bartel et al. (2012) described an approach that analyzed each permission
request to see if the app itself had a use for each permission. Permission requests that had no use
within the app were seen as permission gaps that could lead to increased security risks. However,
the author’s approach did not account for permissions that did have functions within the app, but
could also be used for malicious intent. For example, an app could have a request to make phone
calls and the app may have a technical support number link for that use, but the permission could
also be used to call premium numbers without the user’s knowledge. This would be considered an
excessive permission request if the feature was beyond a reasonable expectation for the type of
app.
Other research suggests a new permission interface that does a better job of explaining the privacy
concerns of requested permissions (Kelly et al., 2013). That authors proposed and tested a new
GUI interface that read the requested permissions and displayed the privacy concerns to the user
in a much more easy to read format.
Desensitization
In this paper, desensitization refers to consumers being numb to permission requests, particularly
excessive permission requests, and installing the app anyway. Apps designed for Android versions
older than 6.0 will display dangerous permission requests at the time of installation as a warning
to consumers. Apps designed for version 6 and later and run on a version 6 or later operating
system will display permission requests after installation and when the app needs the specific
permission.
Warning effectiveness and desensitization has been researched in multiple fields, such as product
and workplace warnings (Schwartz & Driver, 1983), tornado warnings (Simmons & Sutter, 2009),
flood warnings (Molinari & Handmer, 2011), cigarette label warnings (Hammond et al., 2006),
and computer security warnings (Krol et al., 2012; Akhawe & Felt, 2013). However, only one
study investigated desensitization of app permission requests (Harris et al., 2016). In their study,
desensitization was investigated as an antecedent to trust and risk in relation to the intent to install
apps. The authors concluded that desensitization was not a significant factor, but it did have a
negative relationship with risk and a positive relationship with trust, meaning that those that are
desensitized perceive less risk and more trust.
In technology-related warning and desensitization research, Krol et al. (2012) investigated users
receiving a warning before downloading a PDF file. The authors found that 81.7% of the
participants did not heed the warning and downloaded the file. A reason for ignoring the warning
was that users had become desensitized to frequent exposure to warnings and false alarms. Users
also had misunderstandings about the potential security threats which led them to falsely believe
they could recognize the security risks. The study also found that those that heeded the warnings
were overwhelmingly female. Based on this finding, we created the following hypothesis:
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H6: A higher percentage of females will resist installing apps with excessive
permission requests than males.
In a study that investigated certificate warnings when entering Web sites, Kauer et al. (2012) found
that a majority of participants did not understand the warnings. Also, of those that chose to enter
the site despite the warning, the primary reason given was that they trusted the site. Others stated
that they perceived no risk because nothing bad had happened to them before. Based on the
findings in this study, we propose the following hypothesis:
H7: Of those that install apps with excessive permission requests, most will do so
because they trust the market.
A possible explanation for desensitization to warnings can come from Communication Theory. In
a paper that discussed using Communication Theory for creating product warnings and warnings
in the workplace, Schwartz and Driver (1983) discussed comprehensive warnings versus selective
warnings. Comprehensive warnings attempt to display all potential hazards in great detail.
Selective warnings display only a limited number of select hazards. The author’s discussion on
these types of warnings lead to several interesting aspects that may help explain desensitization.
One is that when too much information is given, comprehension of the message may suffer.
Consumers have a limited ability to absorb information and giving too much information may
discourage consumers from even attempting to address the warning (Schwartz & Driver, 1983).
Another is that if the consumer perceives one of the hazards in the warning as a minimal concern,
they may discount the importance of the other hazards addressed in the warning. Also, if
consumers receive a significant number of comprehensive warnings across multiple products, then
all product warnings become less effective. Over-warning can lesson warning credibility.
Consumers installing many apps will likely see permission request warnings with each app. Some
apps may have long lists of permissions seen as comprehensive warnings by consumers and some
may have warnings seen as minimal risks by the consumer. Desensitization to permission requests
may occur under these conditions.
The Communication-Human Information Processing (C-HIP) Model was developed using pieces
of Communication Theory. The C-HIP Model has several stages, one of which is “beliefs and
attitudes.” In a paper by Conzola and Wogalter (2001), the authors explain that a warning can be
processed successfully if it matches the receiver’s current beliefs and attitudes. However, when
people believe they are familiar with a product, they are less likely to read the warnings even if
they see them (Conzola & Wogalter, 2001). Familiarity beliefs are formed from similar past
experiences and can lead to complacency and overconfidence and reduces the likelihood a
consumer will seek additional information, thus reducing the likelihood of reading warnings
(Conzola and Wogalter, 2001). Consumers that install many apps become familiar with the process
of using markets and installing apps. This familiarity may lead consumers to ignoring permission
requests.
In other research about desensitization to warnings, Stewart and Martin (1994) discuss two types
of false alarms. One is a genuine warning false alarm in which a warning proves incorrect because
nothing was at risk. The other is an apparent warning false alarm, in which risk is present, but no
immediate harm follows from a failure to heed the warning (Stewart & Martin, 1994). An apparent
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false alarm is not actually false, but consumers may treat warnings as false alarms when they
cannot connect the warning with an immediate consequence. Consumers become desensitized to
the warnings after repeatedly ignoring the warnings and suffering no immediate consequences
(Stewart & Martin, 1994). When it comes to permission request warnings, consumers may be
desensitized because they cannot make a direct connection with the requests and an immediate
harm. Consumers may see permission requests as apparent false alarms. Based on this research
and the C-HIP Model, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H8: Of those that install apps with excessive permission requests, a majority will do
so because nothing bad has happened to them before.
Survey
To assess precautions taken by consumers before installing mobile applications and desensitization
to permission requests, a 34 question online survey was given via Qualtrics in late 2014 and early
2015. A total of 286 surveys were sent to students registered for information technology classes,
which included IT majors and minors. Of those sent, 227 (79%) were returned and 209 (73%) were
complete for analysis. Respondent’s ages ranged from 17 to 55, with a mean of 23.33. One
hundred sixty-two (77.5%) were male and 47 (22.5%) were female. One hundred seventy (81%)
of the respondents were or had been technology majors, studying information technology or
computer science.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The respondents were asked to specify the operating system on their primary smartphone, tablet,
or both. More respondents used Apple’s iOS, 60.8%, than did Google’s Android, 43.5%. A small
percentage of respondents, 4.3%, reported using both iOS and Android. Beyond Google and
Apple, 3.3% reported using other operating systems. Respondents were asked to report the number
of unique applications they had downloaded on their current device, with a result mean of 34.
Respondents were asked whether they had rooted or jailbroken their device, and 19.7% responded
affirmatively, while 76.5% said they did not have such a device and 3.8% of respondents did not
know. There was no association between having a rooted device and the operating system used,
nor was there an association with the user’s gender.
Slightly fewer than half, 48%, of respondents reported having been a victim of malware and 52%
saying they had not been victims. Once again, there was no association with being a victim of
malware and the operating system used or the respondent’s gender. However, those with rooted
devices were more likely to be victims of malware (chi square=6.772, df=1, p=0.034).
Market Trust
We asked respondents to rate their trust in Google’s Google Play market, Apple’s App Store,
Amazon’s App Store, Microsoft’s App Store, and other 3rd party markets. In this study, the
primary markets are seen as those from Google, Apple, Microsoft, and Amazon. Amazon is
included because of its size, popularity, and reputation for security. All others are seen as 3rd party
markets. The participants rated the markets in five different areas: protecting their personal
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information, such as credit card data; charging the correct amount for an application; limiting
applications from asking for excessive permissions; selling applications that perform as advertised;
and protection from malware. The ratings were on a five-point scale, with 1 indicating “Not
Trustworthy” and 5 indicating “Very Trustworthy.” We then summed these evaluations to get an
overall trust score for each market, ranging from 5 to 25.
In general, the primary markets evaluated similarly. The Apple and Google markets had average
trust ratings of 17.42 and 16.96, respectively. The Amazon market had an average rating of 16.76,
while the Microsoft market’s average rating was 16.0. Third party markets received an average
trust rating of 12.91. Multivariate tests (F=66.545, df=4,205 p<0.001) show that the Apple,
Amazon, and Google markets were trusted significantly more than the Microsoft market (p<0.001,
p=0.002, and p=0.022, respectively). This may be because very few participants used the
Microsoft market and unfamiliarity led to less trust. Third party markets were significantly less
trusted than all the others (p<0.001 for all paired comparisons). Therefore, H2 is supported.
H2: Consumers will trust the major platform markets more than 3rd party markets.
(SUPPO RTED)
Also, users of Apple’s iOS operating system evaluated third-party markets slightly higher than
non-iOS users (t=2.015, df=207, p=0.045). This may be because Apple restricts users from
accessing 3rd party markets and Apple users may not as aware of the risks associated with 3rd party
markets. In addition, Android users evaluated the Apple market lower than non-Android users (t=2.758, df=207, p=0.006). We know from the market trust results that Apple users trust their
primary market more than Android users trust their primary market, so perhaps Android users
carry over that lower level of trust when evaluating the Apple market. Lastly, Android users
evaluated third party markets lower than non-Android users (t=-2.842, df=207, p=0.005). Again,
this may be explained by Android users generally being less trusting of markets.
Of our 209 participants, 94.7% only downloaded their apps from trusted markets, which in this
study includes Apple’s App Store, Google’s Google Play, Windows Phone App Store, and
Amazon’s App Store. Only 5.3% of respondents used 3rd party markets outside of these trusted
primary markets. When investigating just Android users, which is an easier platform for accessing
3rd party markets, only 6.6% did so. These findings support H3.
H3: Most consumers will only download apps from trusted markets. (SUPPORTED)
Precautions
We asked survey respondents about the precautions they took before installing applications,
including whether they read the reviews/star ratings of applications, if they investigate the
application’s developers, whether they read the permissions requested by the application, or
whether they take other precautions. Eighty-three percent said they read the application’s
reviews/star ratings as a precaution, which supports H4. Fifty-five percent said they read the
requested permissions, which does not support H1, but is close to supporting it. This means 45%
do not read permissions as a precaution. Only 26% said they investigated the application’s
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developer, which supports H5. Three percent said they take other precautions, including “common
sense,” “reading tech blogs,” “reading the source code,” and “checking the number of downloads.”
H1: Most consumers will not read app permissions as a precaution before installing
an app. (NOT SUPPORTED)
H4: Most consumers will use star ratings and reviews as a precaution before installing
an app. (SUPPORTED)
H5: Most consumers will not review developers as a precaution before installing an
app. (SUPPORTED)
We counted the number of precautions each respondent took. Twelve percent took no precautions
at all, while 30% took only one precaution. Thirty-eight percent said they took two precautions,
while 19% took three precautions. There was no association between the number of precautions
taken and whether the respondent had a rooted device or was a victim of malware. Apple iOS
users were more likely than non-iOS users to take no precautions at all, with 17% taking no
precautions (chi square=103.415, df=3, p=0.004, Somer’s d=-.255). Android users were slightly
more likely to take more precautions (chi square=25.503, df=3, p<0.001, Somer’s d=0.372). This
may be because iOS is considered a safer platform than Android.
Desensitization
We asked survey respondents if they were likely to abort the installation of an application that
asked for excessive permissions, such as asking to access their contacts or track their locations.
Seventy-seven percent of respondents said that they agreed or strongly agreed that they would
abort the installation of this kind of application, while only 10% of respondents disagreed or
strongly disagreed.
Investigating intent, we then asked respondents under what circumstances they would ignore an
application asking for excessive permissions and install it anyway. Table 1 shows their responses
to several scenarios they were presented. The circumstances under which a majority of
respondents said they would ignore permission requests were if they trusted the market, nothing
bad has happened to them before, and if they really wanted the application. They were less likely
to ignore the permission requests if whenever they read the permissions, everything looked OK, if
they did not understand the requests, or if it took too long to read the requests. As Table 1 shows,
however, sizeable minorities of respondents would ignore permission requests under these
circumstances.
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Table 1: Circumstances under Which Respondents Ignore Excessive Permission Requests
and Install the App Anyway.
Neither
Strongly
Agree
Disagree
Disagree
nor
Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Total

I trust the market.

7
(3.3%)

38
(18.2%)

44
(21.1%)

97
(46.4%)

23
(11%)

209

Nothing bad has happened to
me before.

14
(6.7%)

50
(23.9%)

38
(18.2%)

92
(44%)

15
(7.2%)

209

I do not understand the
permission requests.

26
(12.4%)

75
(35.9%)

55
(26.3%)

44
(21.1%)

9
(4.3%)

209

It takes too long to read
them.

24
(11.5%)

53
(25.4%)

47
(22.5%)

69
(33%)

16
(7.7%)

209

Whenever I read them, the
always look OK.

12
(5.7%)

40
(19.1%)

70
(33.5%)

72
(34.4%)

15
(7.2%)

209

I really want the application.

14
(6.7%)

38
(18.2%)

53
(25.4%)

86
(41.1%)

18
(8.6%)

209

We asked survey respondents if they had ever actually installed an application that they believed
asked for excessive permissions. Fifty-six percent said they had installed such applications
anyway, while 44% said they had not. There was no association between installing these
applications and whether the respondent had a rooted device, was a victim of malware, was an iOS
user, or was an Android user. Forty-five percent of the female respondents had installed apps
asking for excessive permissions and 59% of the male respondents had done so. This supports H6.
H6: A higher percentage of females will resist installing apps with excessive
permission requests than males. (SUPPORTED)
For those respondents who had installed applications asking for excessive permissions, we asked
further questions to see what would prompt them to do so. Of the 116 who installed such
applications, 68% said they did so because they trusted the market from which they downloaded
the application. This supports H7.
H7: Of those that install apps with excessive permission requests, most will do so
because they trust the market. (SUPPORTED)
Fifty-eight percent said there was often a good reason for the application to request the
permissions. Another 54% said they just wanted the application and did not care about the
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permission requests, while 53% said that nothing bad had happened to them when they had
installed such applications before. This supports H9.
H8: Of those that install apps with excessive permission requests, most will do so
because nothing bad has happened to them before. (SUPPORTED)
Prediction Model
In an effort to predict the behavior of survey respondents with excessive permission requests, we
constructed a prediction model designed to predict whether respondents would install applications
asking for excessive permissions (0=yes, 1=no). A logistic regression model was used to estimate
the model with this as the dependent variable. Independent variables entered in the preliminary
model were the evaluations of the five markets, whether the respondent used iOS, the respondent’s
age and gender, the number of precautions taken, and whether the respondent was a technology
major.
Using stepwise entry of the independent variables based on the likelihood ratio criterion, a model
including only the number of precautions was significant. Table 2 shows the model statistics. In
logistic regression, the Hosmer and Lemeshow chi square statistic is used to test the hypothesis
that the predicted values are significantly different from the observed values (Hosmer &
Lemeshow, 2000). The Hosmer and Lemeshow test indicated that there was no significant lack of
fit between the model and the data (chi square=0.657, df=2, p=0.720). The Nagelkerke R2 value
was developed to show the amount of variation accounted for by a logistic regression model. As
with a linear regression, values range between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating a perfect fit (Hair, et al.,
2006). The Nagelkerke R2 value was 0.044. The model shows those who take more precautions
are somewhat less likely to download applications with excessive permission requests than those
who take fewer precautions. The security savviness of these users is better in that they take
increased precautions and avoid apps asking for excessive permissions.
Table 2: Prediction Model Logistic Regression Model.
Variable

B

Standard Error

Significance

Exp (B)

Constant

.437

0.287

0.128

1.548

-0.405

0.155

0.009

.667

# of Precautions

The exponentiated regression coefficient value is .667. This indicates that each additional
precaution a respondent takes reduces the odds that he or she will install an app asking for
excessive permissions by one-third.
Table 3 shows the predictive accuracy of the model. As shown in the table, the model classified
59.8% of the respondents correctly, with better success in the Yes condition (65.5%).
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Table 3: Prediction Model Logistic Model Accuracy.

Observed
Have you ever installed
an application you
believed asked for
excessive permissions?

Predicted
Have you ever installed an
application you believed asked
for excessive permissions?
Percentage
Yes
No
Correct
Yes

76

40

65.5

No

44

49

52.7
59.8

Overall Percentage

DISCUSSION
Participants in this study averaged over 34 downloads each, which establishes the sample as a
group that has significant experience with mobile applications. Unlike worldwide and national
averages, this group had more iOS representation than Android representation. Almost one in five
of those surveyed rooted or jailbroke their devices, which made them more likely to be a victim of
malware in this study. Rooting or jailbreaking a mobile device removes the built-in security
restrictions, making the devices more vulnerable to malware. Thus, this result is expected and fits
current research trends.
Participants in the study trusted the Apple App Store and the Google’s Google Play markets
significantly more than Microsoft’s market, which was a little surprising considering Microsoft is
a major market with their own platform. However, all three of these markets and Amazon are seen
as significantly more trustworthy than 3rd party markets, which fits current research that suggests
most malware is present on 3rd party markets.
More than half of those surveyed installed apps asking for excessive permissions. However,
installing apps asking for excessive permission must come with major concerns based on the
survey results indicating 84% agree or strongly agree that they are very concerned with protecting
their privacy and 78% agree or strongly agree that they are concerned with malware. There appears
to be contradiction with one’s concern for privacy and malware and the installation of apps asking
for excessive permissions.
Of those who installed apps with excessive permissions, 68% said it was because they trusted the
market. However, all markets contain malware, ask for excessive permissions, and have major
privacy concerns (Harris et al., 2014). The before mentioned Appthority (2014) study indicated
that Apple’s App Store’s top apps were more risky than Google Play’s top apps and our survey
participants trusted the Apple App Store the most. With 58% stating there is often a good reason
for the application to request questionable permissions and 53% stating nothing bad had happened
to them before, there is an indication of desensitization among consumers. This supports
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theoretical research using Communication Theory and the C-HIP Model. When consumers no
longer reject apps with excessive permissions because nothing has ever happened to them before
and the belief that there is a good reason for the permission requests if they were to investigate,
those consumers have become desensitized to excessive permission requests. Desensitization to
permission requests puts the consumer at great risk and renders permission request lists even more
inadequate. Consumer desensitization to excessive permission requests is also supported by the
before mentioned (Benton et al. 2013) study that concluded permissions were still ineffective even
after adding additional text warnings to permission requests.
A prediction model was presented in this paper that attempts to predict whether participants will
download applications asking for excessive permissions. Research demonstrates it is highly
advisable to avoid apps with excessive permissions (Harris et al., 2015). Those that took more
precautions installed less apps with excessive permission requests. While this may indicate sound
security behavior by taking more precautions and downloading less apps with excessive
permissions, avoiding apps with excessive permissions is the more important security practice.
This is because while taking more precautions may seem like a good thing, the particular
precautions taken by our participants are not all sound security precautions. For example, this
paper has already established that application star ratings and reviews are not related to security
risk, thus are not adequate as a security precaution. Reviewing the developer can be a good
security precaution, but it is not efficient because there are many developers with little or no
information available about them. Unless there is published negative information about a
developer, it is hard to determine a developer’s credibility. Also, if a developer has published
negative information, they may be less likely to have apps on the major markets to begin with.
Thus, only developers with clean records will have apps on the major markets, making it harder to
research developers. Only 26% of the participants in this study reviewed the developer as a
precaution. The best precaution these consumers can take is to thoroughly review and understand
the app permissions and how they affect security. However, this paper has already established that
users most often fail to understand permission requests even if they read them. In addition, those
that do understand the permission may be desensitized to them. Overall, the precautions our
participants are taking are mostly ineffective and may be giving consumers a false sense of
security, thus leading to the highly reported victimization from malware (48%).
The results of this study have implications for businesses that should be a major concern. With
the popularity of BYOD, businesses need to be aware of employee’s mobile device security
practices. If devices are used for both business and personal use, whether business issued or
BYOD, apps that can access the devices contacts, phone numbers, phone ID, location, text
messages, and more may gain access to sensitive business data. Devices used for business and
personal use is a relatively new phenomena that businesses are still learning how to address. Large
organizations with highly skilled information technology security teams have begun to address the
issue with enterprise mobile management systems (EMMs), mobile device management systems
(MDMs), enterprise app markets, and other technologies. However, smaller businesses with
limited resources that are not utilizing these technologies are at more risk. All organizations need
to be aware of their employee’s potential problematic mobile device security practices and address
those concerns through awareness and education programs. But organizations with limited
information security technologies need to be even more vigilant at educating their employees about
the risks associated with mobile apps, permission requests, and desensitization.
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CONCLUSION
This study investigated the influences on consumers before downloading and installing mobile
applications. A prediction model was created, and the study results indicate that increased efforts
to educate consumers about potential security and privacy risks from permission requests and
desensitization are necessary. Additionally, efforts are needed to inform consumers about the
unreliability of common precautions, such as researching developers and app reviews\star ratings.
New methods that simply explain permission requests may not suffice if consumers have become
desensitized.
This paper contributes to the existing research literature in several important ways. First, the
current study develops and presents a unique model to help predict the installation of apps asking
for excessive permissions. Second, the results of the current study delineate the need for changing
the way permissions are displayed and explained to consumers, for this may largely be ineffective,
particularly if consumers have become desensitized to app permission requests. Finally, the current
study contributes to the existing knowledge base in that it clearly demonstrates that consumers still
do not understand what precautions should be taken before installing apps. There is too much
reliance on reviews and star ratings and not enough reliance on reading, comprehending, and
heeding permission request warnings.
As with all studies, this study has some limitations. First, since the sample population surveyed
consisted largely of information technology students, and all of these students were from the same
educational institution, generalizability of the results may be limited. A future research direction
is to diversify the demographics of the population to students from a variety of majors. In addition,
surveying students in different institutions across different regions would enrich the data
collection. Another extension of this research is to survey professionals and compare the results
from this data to that of the student population. Analyzing results from such a larger data set may
highlight trends that would be more generalizable.
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